

NEAR EAST CRISIS SHAKING EUROPE'S EQUANIMITY

By FRANK H. SIMONDS.

LIKE the Silesian question, the present Greco-Turkish crisis in Asia Minor has at least two distinct phases, the immediate and local, which in this case concerns the Greeks and Turks, and the wider and even more important, which directly affects Great Britain, France and Italy and less closely Russia, Rumania and Bulgaria and, in fact, all of the nations in south-eastern Europe. The truth is that in the region out of which came the spark which lighted the world conflagration—namely, the Near East—a new fire is breaking out which has already disturbed the equanimity of most of the nations of Europe.

Looked at from its local aspect, the Greco-Turkish dispute grows out of certain decisions which were embodied in the Treaty of Sevres, one of the companion pieces to the Treaty of Versailles, in which the Paris Conference undertook to reorganize the map of the world in conformity with the decision reached upon the battlefield and the desires of the States which had procured that decision by defeating Germany and her allies. The Sevres document, even more fragile, as events were to prove, than the war which bears the same name, was a definite attempt to solve the whole Eastern question.

When the document was drafted all of the great Powers were agreed upon the principle of "bag and baggage," the name which in the previous century had been applied to the demand that the Turk be forced to quit Europe altogether. Thus the Treaty of Sevres undertook to partition the Sick Man's estate on the assumption that this chronic invalid of Europe had at last perished. And in partitioning the Turk's estate Greece, represented by a great man who had earned an almost unrivalled position in Paris, was recognized as the chief heir.

The Age Long Dream of a

Christian Constantinople

Thanks to Venizelos, the great Hellenic dream through so many centuries—the dream that was Byzantine even more than Hellenic—seemed on the point of realization. To Greece was assigned all of the Turkish territory in Europe right down to the Chatalja lines, where the Bulgarian advance of the first Balkan war had been halted, save only the shore of the Straits and the Gallipoli Peninsula, which were reserved for the international commission which was to mount guard at the Golden Horn. In addition, by a treaty done at Neuilly, Bulgaria was compelled to cede to Greece her window on the Aegean, the remaining fragment of her spoils won in the first Balkan war, thus giving Greece continuity of territory from Athens to the outskirts of Constantinople.

In addition Greece was to have all of the Aegean Islands, including the Dodecanesus, taken from the Turk by the Italian in the Libyan war, save only Rhodes, which was to remain in Italian hands until a later plebiscite. Finally Greece was to have Smyrna and a wide hinterland on the Asiatic mainland, in which, after a certain period of Greek occupation, final possession was to be determined by a plebiscite. Such was the decision of Sevres so far as it affected the Greek, but there was also renunciation by the Turk of his Armenian, Syrian, Mesopotamian and Palestine provinces. In a word, the Turk surrendered to Western Powers Smyrna, with its hinterland, and all of his Armenian and Arabic provinces. In addition he recognized Italian interests about the Gulf of Adalia and in a broad hinterland adjoining the Greek sphere of Smyrna.

All of this arrangement was made while Venizelos was in power in Greece and well nigh the most conspicuous single figure in the allied councils. It meant the doom of the Turk, who not only lost all of his European possessions, including his capital, which became the seat of an international commission, but also surrendered the larger part of his Asiatic empire. It was a death sentence which could only be carried out by force, since the Turk was bound to resist to the death.

No sooner had the Sevres treaty been completed than Venizelos fell and Constantine returned to Athens. But Constantine was not only the brother-in-law of the Kaiser but he had also been throughout the war an obstinate opponent of the Allies, who had thwarted them at every turn and even conspired to procure the murder of French marines in Athens itself. He had been deposed by allied consent; his return meant instantly the collapse of the pro-allied sentiment in Greece.

Instantly the unanimity of the three great Allies—France, Britain and Italy—disappeared. France was dead against Constantine, favored resisting his return to the throne and at once demanded the revision of

Greco-Turkish Fires of War Threaten to Set More Than Moslem World Aflame---Great Britain, in Nominal Control of Constantinople and Behind Constantine's Efforts to Retain Lands That Were Won by Venizelos's Diplomacy, Bitterly Opposed by France, Italy and Bulgaria

the Treaty of Sevres, still unsigned, in such fashion as to deprive Greece of the larger share of her gains at the expense of the Turk. On the surface, French opinion and policy were influenced by enduring distrust and dislike of Constantine.

But in reality this was only one phase. France saw with unconcealed bitterness the expansion of British influence in the Near East, recognized that the British had decided to make the Greek their soldier and agent in the Near East, to give to the Greek the same support which in the last century they had bestowed upon the Turk, and for the same reason. If Greece should become the most considerable nation in the Near East nothing was clearer than that Britain would, in fact, be the force behind the scenes in all Greek policy.

Beyond this France had several personal reasons for preferring the Turk to the Greek. Under the Treaty of Sevres, France had acquired not only Syria but the Anatolian region of Cilicia about the Gulf of Alexandretta. And no sooner had French troops landed at Beirut and moved inland than the Turks began a campaign to defend Cilicia, and the French not only suffered several defeats but were forced to multiply their garrisons in Syria and in Cilicia. Thus, since French public opinion was solidly against a Turkish war, there was nothing left for the French to do but make peace with the Turk.

This, moreover, the French have done. Recently they signed an agreement with Sany Bey, an agent of Kemal, the Turkish Nationalist leader, by which France resigned Cilicia and accepted a frontier in the main following the Bagdad Railway line from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates, where Turkish, British and French boundaries meet. In addition to yielding a goodly portion of the territory acquired through the Treaty of Sevres, the French pledged themselves to support the Turks generally in all their claims.

Thus for a whole variety of reasons the French have chosen to back the Turk, to work for his reinstatement at Constantinople, Smyrna and elsewhere. By such a policy they hope to avoid a war with the Turk on the frontiers of Syria; they expect, also, to block British aspirations to dominate Constantinople and the Near East generally, through manipulation of the Greek agent. If the Turk wins, manifestly France, who is, by the way, the chief holder of Turkish debts antedating the war, may look forward to being first friend. If the Greek wins, British control is certain.

Italian Policy for Years Has Been

To Prevent Greek Control of Aegean

The Italian point of view is slightly different. Greece is directly a rival of Italy in all the Near East. For many years Italian policy has sought to prevent the Greek from obtaining control of the Aegean, exactly as it has aimed at blocking the advance of the Southern Slavs to the Adriatic. In a word, as the Southern Slavs are regarded by the Italians as possible rivals in the Adriatic, the Greeks are held as present adversaries in all of the eastern end of the Mediterranean. This rivalry culminates in the disputes over the Greek islands of the Dodecanesus and over Smyrna. Both are objects of Italian ambition.

By the Treaty of Sevres Italy acquired certain interests about the Gulf of Adalia, but she lost Smyrna, which had been promised to her more or less directly as one of the rewards for participation in the war on the allied side. She was also forced to consent to the transfer of the Dodecanesus to Greece and to the extension of Greek territory into the southern portion of Albania. To be sure, Greek claims both in the Dodecanesus and in Northern Epirus were founded alike upon history and ethnic conditions, but Greece as a rival would profit and Italy lose unmistakably, if these arrangements were carried out.

Moreover, to realize her aspirations even about the Gulf of Adalia, Italy found herself confronted, like the French in Cilicia, with the necessity to fight a new Turkish war, and neither Italian finance nor Italian popular sentiment was favorable to a new adventure which might in the end prove as disastrous as the Abyssinian venture of the nineteenth century. Accordingly Italy washed her hands of the Sevres compact. She would contribute nothing to enforcing it, not a soldier or a ship. On the contrary she took her stand squarely with the French in advocating a sweeping revision all in the interests of the Turk and at the expense of

the Greek. Oddly enough, just as Italy stands with Britain against France in Upper Silesia, she stands with France against Britain in the Aegean.

British policy, as a consequence, is very much embarrassed. The British would still like to dominate at Constantinople, in fact they are in actual if not nominal control there and mean to remain in control. But this means, if Greece is eliminated or forced to yield to the Turk both in Europe and in Asia Minor that the British will have to find troops to garrison not only Constantinople, itself but the Asiatic shores of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora. The ideal situation, from the English point of view, would be for Greece to furnish the soldiers and hold the nominal control, while British authority was exercised behind this mask.

But to support Greece means now to embark upon a new adventure. The very throne of Constantine is at stake. He must make good Greek title to the lands which Venizelos persuaded the Conference of Paris to assign to his country, or he will have to return to his Swiss exile, discredited for all time. And all efforts of the allied countries to persuade Constantine to agree to a compromise have failed up to date, with the result that a new campaign is just about to begin.

This is, in fact, the second Greek bid, for last winter a Greek operation pushed eastward from Smyrna and southward from the Sea of Marmora until it came to grief along the Anatolian portion of the Bagdad Railway, near Eskisheir. This Greek defeat brought the Turk back to environs both of Constantinople and of Smyrna. Since then both sides have been accumulating arms and munitions and a new conflict is just beginning.

With a New Campaign On

England May Be Forced to Join

If the Greeks should win this war the British position in the Near East would be consolidated, provided Constantine were as loyal to a British master as he once was to a German relative. But the Greeks can hardly win without British support and assistance, even if they can achieve success with this assistance. And to give this assistance at once involves the British in bitter dispute with their French and Italian associates and adversaries at home that Great Britain is engaging upon a new imperialist adventure at the moment when national sentiment is roused against all use of men and money upon any warlike enterprise, at precisely the time when London is talking more of the evacuation of Mesopotamia than of the conquest of Anatolia.

Moreover, it is going to be exceedingly difficult for the British to insist upon the acquisition by her favored friend Greece of great Anatolian territories, in many of which the Greek element is a minority, while demanding that Poland, the chosen friend of France, abandon all her claims to territories in which the Poles are a clear majority and have recently indicated their desire to be joined to Poland. To get a free hand for the Greeks Britain would undoubtedly have to listen to French proposals in Upper Silesia, but this would open the way to new disagreements with Italy, who is permanently anti-Greek and might change her vote in all allied conferences from the British to the French side, thereby shifting the control in the Supreme Council.

Since Greece has persevered in her campaign, despite the fact that Marshal Foch has foretold defeat, for exactly the same reasons the Polish offensive against Kiev failed two years ago, the British have now to face the not less disturbing possibilities of Greek defeat. This means that the Turks will come back to the Scutari shore of the Dardanelles at least. It means that British control in Constantinople can only be made secure by the use of considerable numbers of troops, since the Osmanli are bound to seek to regain their capital and free their Sultan, whom they insist is now a prisoner of the allied nations.

In this conflict the Sultan nominally opposes the Nationalistic elements, led by Kemal Pasha, who has made his capital at Angora. But every one in Constantinople knows that all Turkish sympathies are with Kemal and a sweeping Turkish victory would have instant echoes in that city. There is, too, the Bolshevik detail, for the Turks and the Bolsheviks have joined hands and fortunes across the Caucasus and Russian ammunition and artillery, the booty of the Wrangel victory, are being transported to the Turkish armies through all the Black Sea ports.

Far Reaching Consequences

Of a New Greco-Turkish War

A Greco-Turkish war, too, will have repercussions all over the Mohammedan world. It will mean instant and acute trouble for the French in Syria; it will mean only less immediate difficulty for the British in Mesopotamia, while, given the present unrest in Egypt and in portions of India, there may be undesirable echoes in both countries. Indeed, all British, French and Italian colonies and protectorates on the south side of the Mediterranean may easily be disturbed, while British peace from Palestine to Burma may be menaced.

Yet the single alternative is the exercise of force to restrain the Greeks, and this means that it will be necessary to yield to most, if not all, of the more considerable Turkish demands, the very first of which will be the reoccupation in fact of Constantinople, with Adrianople as well. Not only will British control in Constantinople be ended but the Turk will return filled with resentment for the part Britain has played throughout all recent years. To use force against the Greek friend merely to arrive at such an end is hardly an attractive prospect.

Anglo-French relations in the Near East are at the moment complicated by the decision of the British to recognize the Emir Feisal as the native sovereign of Mesopotamia. Feisal is an old foe of France. At the Peace Conference in Paris he was constantly used by the British to block French aspirations in Syria. When France at last obtained the Syrian mandate, Feisal went back to Damascus and, at first the recipient of French subsidies, organized resistance to French occupation, which led to fighting, in which French troops had the upper hand and Gen. Gouraud promptly sent Feisal into exile. The place of exile proved to be London.

To put Feisal in a position of influence in Mesopotamia and thus on the frontiers of French Syria can only mean, in the long run, a new collision. Moreover, the French believe that Feisal will promptly join hands with Kemal in a campaign to evict the French, British and Italians, as well as the Greeks, from all the Mohammedan lands of the Near East, Egypt and North Africa as well. As a consequence French bitterness over British policy in the Near East is, at the moment, almost unprecedently keen. As for Italian sentiment, if it is less vengeful, it is only a little less resentful.

Tangle More Intricate

With Bulgaria in It

There is a Bulgarian end to the tangle, too. The Treaty of Neuilly deprived the Bulgarians of their single Aegean port of Dedeagatch and the strip of land along the west bank of the Maritza, which gave them access to this port, including the land near Adrianople, which was ceded by the Sultan to Ferdinand directly, as a reward for Bulgarian entrance into the world war. This punishment of Bulgaria was strongly opposed by the United States representatives in Paris, who insisted that it would lead to future wars and worked substantial injustice. On the whole Greek ethnic claims would seem to be far better than Bulgaria's, except for relatively small areas between Adrianople and the Black Sea, but Bulgarian

aspirations are unmistakable.

Moreover, French and Italian support for the Bulgarian claim to such portions of Thrace as are not handed over to the Turk is manifest. Thus one more possible complication following a Turkish victory over Greece might be an intervention by Bulgaria to regain her lost lands in Thrace. Whether such a Bulgarian move would provoke Rumanian or Serbian protest is debatable. In the old Venizelos days Rumania, Greece and Serbia were united by treaty against Bulgaria, but Greece, despite Venizelos, repudiated her obligations to Serbia in 1915, and one may doubt whether the Serb would now be overanxious to come to the support of the very King who in similar circumstances betrayed him only six years ago.

In sum, then, it is patent that despite all of its efforts, the Paris conference failed completely to solve the Eastern question. It found a chaos out of which the world war had come, it left a new chaos, in part surviving the war, in part resulting from that struggle. Once more, as always in the nineteenth century, conflicting interests among the great Powers make cooperation in the Near East well nigh impossible. The French want one thing, the British another, the Italian has a third objective, although he shares the French hostility to the Greek and has taken advantage of the supreme folly of the Greeks in recalling Constantine and dismissing Venizelos to pursue his own ends.

And in the background there is always Russia. Even if the Soviet alliance, the bargain between Kemal and Lenin, leads to nothing, it is certain that in the future, when a real Russia emerges from the present chaos, the first objective of that Russia will be the possession of Constantinople and the Straits, which were promised to Czarist Russia as a reward for Russian effort during the world war. And the nation which holds these southern gates to Russia, when that time comes, whether it be Greece, Turkey or Great Britain, will find itself confronted with prospect of a new struggle.

To-day the whole of the Near East, indeed of the Mohammedan world, is in ferment. No man can say what will be the limits of this Greek campaign, which represents a desperate effort of Constantine to keep his throne by retaining the lands which Venizelos by diplomacy won for Greece and the King by returning placed in jeopardy. We may have a brief campaign ending in fiasco on one side or the other, or we may have a conflict which will light fires of fanaticism from the Indian Ocean to Morocco. Both possibilities are unmistakable.

As to the condition of the opposing armies, neither seems very attractive. Constantine by banishing the Venizelist officers and recalling his favorites reduced the army to a condition in which the defeat of Eskisheir was an inevitable consequence. Both the Greeks and the Turks have been at war, with very brief interruptions for many years, the Greeks since 1912, the Turks since 1911. Numerically and in the matter of arms and ammunition the Greeks plainly have the better. But in fighting capacity the odds seem to be on the Turk.

In any event we seem in for another war, a minor war, measured by recent standards, but a war which may have almost incalculable consequences both in Europe and in Asia.

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Japan's Course in Siberian Republic Tends to Help the Bolshevik Cause

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Russian and consequently formed an admirable No Man's Land for adventurous politicians and financiers. Khorvot is a typical courtier of the old regime, highly cultured, of excellent manners, speaking faultlessly six European languages, a great authority on Mozart, Strauss and German mystical opera, but with no principles whatever.

Recently Khorvot organized in Pekin a "Special Government Commission" for dealing with Russian subjects in China and is posing as the one person in the Far East who is defending Russian interests, but during the Kolchak period he played exclusively for his own hand—with the help of the Japanese—and is probably doing so still. If anything he is an imperialist and a reactionary, and Gen. Graves, the American military leader at Vladivostok, never trusted him.

I might here remark that the late Gen. Kappell's followers, a few thousand men, were armed by the Japanese at Grodovsk and Nikola-Ussurisk before they were landed by the Japs at Vladivostok. Semenoff was in Port Arthur until the Japs sent him and his merry men to Vladivostok; and Baron Ungern-Sternberg is in Mongolia, harried by Bolsheviks, Chinese, Mongolians and rival Russian bandits. Khorvat may soon have to leave Harbin owing to the smart diplomacy of the Soviet Government, which has cut the ground from under his feet by handing over all the leased territory in China to the Pekin Government and handing over all the Russians in China along with it.

Lenine's Losses But Little

By His Magnanimity

As these Russians are all anti-Bolshevik and as the Reds had no earthly chance of ever getting back the Chinese Eastern Railway, Lenine lost little by his magnanimity. He has also generously refused to accept the Boxer indemnity—which, by the way, the Peking Government was paying, not to him, but to the anti-Bolshevik Russian diplomatists and consuls in China, and has cancelled all obligations of every kind owing by China to the Russian Government and to Russian capitalists.

Lenine adopted the same policy for the same reasons in his recently concluded treaty with Persia, for puts England in an awkward fix, for on one hand you have the Reds voluntarily divesting themselves of all the privileges they obtained by a century of war and diplomacy in these Eastern countries, declaring that the Oriental is absolutely equal to the Occidental, making a clean sweep of debts, lands, mines, churches and even extraterritoriality, while on the other hand you have the Western Powers insisting on extraterritoriality, on the payment of loans forced on imbecile princes, now defunct, and on the recognition of innumerable concessions and privileges in favor of their subjects and themselves.

Naturally the Orientals are inclined to regard Lenine as the just man made perfect and his enemies as swindlers who by a combination of force, diplomacy, money, fraud, gin and missionaries, managed during the course of the last hundred years to tie them up in impossible knots. The result may be very serious for foreign interests in Asia. It has certainly been very good for Bolshevik prestige. There are now in Moscow diplomatic representatives from Persia, Angora, Afghanistan and China, and they think a lot of Old Man Lenine, for whereas the Czar made considerable trouble from time to time about missionaries and concessionaires, Lenine has intimated that he would be rather pleased than otherwise if these Oriental gentry handed all the Russian missionaries and concessionaires they laid hands on.

In China the Russian Imperialist Minister, who has been living tranquilly for the last three years on the ample proceeds of the Boxer indemnity, paid to him with

touching regularity and honesty, by the Pekin Government, has now found it convenient to bolt, and Russians resident in the Middle Kingdom are hastily buying Mexican, Portuguese and Nicaraguan passports, as otherwise they would come under Chinese jurisdiction.

Northern Manchuria and Mongolia

Likely to Fall to Japanese

A few words about Far Eastern Siberia may not be out of place here. When Kolchak fled from Omsk in the winter of 1919 the Reds followed him as far as Lake Baikal, but the Japanese prevented them from coming further. They then formed the Far Eastern Soviet Republic, a sort of buffer State, moderately Bolshevik, with its capital at Chita and Commissar Tobolsen or Krasnoshebekov as its President. As a matter of fact, the form of government is not yet settled, for there is a Constituent Assembly sitting now at Chita, but practically it is a Soviet Republic. Nominally it includes the Trans-Baikal, Primorsk and Sakhalin, but the Japs have grabbed the northern half of Sakhalin and dominate Kamchatka and the very rich southern part of the Primorsk district with the town of Vladivostok. As it is probable that all northern Manchuria and all Mongolia will also fall under Japanese influence, the Muscovite hold on the Pacific may be regarded as lost.

The two great dangers of the world are (1) Bolshevism and (2) the "rising tide of color," and on the eastern shores of Siberia these two dread forces have already come into conflict, striking at the weakest link in the white chain, for none of the white peoples have any sympathy with Bolshevism. America is the only nation likely to later on, but it is difficult to see what she can do more. It would be very hard for her to send an army to drive the Japs out of Siberia, because she would first have to annihilate Japan itself, and even if she did land an army in Siberia she would derive little assistance from the Russians. The White Russians are mostly in the pay of Japan and the Red Russians are "nobody's darling."

In 1919 America did send a military force to Vladivostok under Gen. Graves, but that leader found himself more opposed to the Japanese and the White Russians than he did to the Bolsheviks, and the same thing would happen again if another force were sent.

It is unlikely that the Mikado's Government will ever put itself flagrantly in the wrong by launching a great attack on Siberia and proclaiming its annexation. It will more likely keep a considerable number of high class Russians in its pay as figureheads, and encourage those Russians who are not high class to cut one another's throats for the sake of Karl Marx.

Gives Story in Detail

Of Fighting in Vladivostok

The gist of the foregoing information comes from Chita, and after having translated it from the Russian and expanded it with my own comments I received a full account, also from the Far East, of the coup at Vladivostok. I translate it as follows:

"VLADIVOSTOK, May 30.

"From the morning of May 26 to the evening of May 27 there was fighting in the streets of Vladivostok between the police of the Far Eastern Republic and the bands of Semenoff, assisted by the Japanese. At 8 A. M. on May 26 a group of armed bandits attacked a convoy of republican police conveying arrested conspirators and the Japanese disarmed the convoy. The insurgents had meanwhile attacked and taken all the Government establishments, the naval staff, the administrative section of the National Assembly, &c. At noon on the 26th Kappellites landed and at the same time the Japanese began disarming all the republican police. A group of Kappellites forced their way into the chancellery of the National Assembly, killed the officer in command of the National Guard and arrested the President of the National

Assembly. There was firing in different parts of the town all day on the 26th, and among others the Mayor, Kosminsky, was killed.

"On the 27th another force of the late Gen. Kappell's troops tried to land, but were prevented by the republican sailors. On the 28th the workmen employed in the shipbuilding yards rose and recaptured for the republic the greater part of the town. The Kappellites began to retreat, but then there suddenly appeared on the scene strong Japanese detachments which surrounded and disarmed the workmen. Lepenin, the commander of the republican police, was arrested by the Japanese.

"The Japanese official report, nevertheless, asserted that the revolution had been accomplished without bloodshed and without Japanese intervention.

"The town is guarded throughout by Japanese, under whose protection the Semenoff leaders suppressed all the republican newspapers and replaced them by the old Kolchak organs. The Vladivostok population, generally speaking, is hostile to the revolution and to the new masters of Vladivostok. Many public meetings have been held in Vladivostok, and at all of them every speaker emphasized the provocative role played by the Japanese and the cynicism with which they handed over power to their paid agents, Semenoff and his associates. The occupation of the Government bank by the revolutionists led to a bloody conflict between the Semenoffites and the Kappellites, but this was liquidated by the Japanese, who drove away both parties and occupied the bank themselves."

This was the contents of the message I have just received from Vladivostok. I do not vouch for it in any way, but it is the first detailed account I have yet received.

Other Revolutions Conducted

By Japanese in Siberia

I might add that Nikola-Ussurisk and all the other parts of the Siberian coast of the Pacific have experienced at the same time revolutions conducted by the Japanese on exactly the same lines as the Vladivostok revolution. So that the whole Pacific coast of Siberia is now practically in Japanese hands, for the Russians, who are nominally in control, are really in Japanese pay. I have been in Siberia in an official capacity and know for a fact that Semenoff is a paid Japanese agent.

There will be little sympathy in America for the dispossessed Bolsheviks, but I would point out that they are very mild Bolsheviks and in many cases not Bolsheviks at all. Had the Japanese cleared out of Siberia in 1920 when the Americans and British went the Far Eastern Republic would be no more Bolshevik to-day than Estonia or Latvia. It is the constant Japanese pressure which makes it cling to Moscow, though even so it is still very much milder in its Socialism than Moscow, and was never Communist or Terrorist.

The excitement in Soviet circles in Moscow in connection with this Japanese onslaught is intense, and Chicherin in his note to Lord Curzon says that France is behind Japan. He also accuses the Japs of seizing all the fishery rights on the Kamchatka coast, of sending the bands of Semenoffites to grab the whole Chinese Eastern Railway, of helping Baron Ungern-Sternberg to terrorize Mongolia, so that he may get a jumping off place from which he can attack the Chita republic, and of sending their agents into Central Asia in order to stir up trouble in Afghanistan. He asserts that reactionaries from Turkestan have been received in Japan, where the Japanese are helping them to draw up plans for a rising against the Soviet. Chicherin holds the Entente responsible for this action, which is, he says, inconsistent with the Anglo-Russian trade agreement. He emphasizes the fact that all this activity began just after Japan had signed with the Far Eastern Republic an agreement by which she undertook to withdraw her troops from Siberia.

Literary Sandwichmen in Wall Street

NOT even Cultured Carrie could have devised a better plan for uplifting the illiterate bankers of our own main street than the phalanx of sandwich men who invaded it a few days ago carrying signs exhorting the bulls, the bears, and the goats to "Read This Thriller To-night" and "Take That Best Seller Home to the Wife and Kiddies." Illiterate brokers, whose reading hitherto has been confined to the ticker tapes and the market reports, stared in amazement.

To make the literary atmosphere more convincing, all the sandwich men were attired in artists' garb—colored smocks, black-Tam of Shantung, Windsor tie, and half size mustache and beard. A report of this strange procession having reached THE New York Herald office (through underground channels known only to Traffic Officer Flynn of the Wall Street squad and two or three others) a reporter was sent to interview the sandwich men and find out, if possible, their views on literature and the Volstead act, and just how deep in ignorance were our prominent business men.

The reporter ran into the first at the corner of Broadway. He was surrounded by a motley crowd of bankers, trust company officers and ex-curb messengers in limousines, all trying to read at one time the copies of "Zell" and "Moon-Calf," which he had anchored by ropes to various parts of his person. Seeing that it was useless to wade through the crowd, the reporter snared the sandwich man by means of a large pretzel at the end of a long pole, which he held over the heads of the throng and gradually drew toward him. This snared the victim confessed that his name was A. Kokopopoulos, but refused to make any

further statement for the press. In fact, his further remarks were largely Greek to the reporter.

Another literary sandwich man was speared at Nassau street. "My dear young man," he said, after the preliminary introductions were over, "I have absolutely no interest in whether the business people of this district read books or do not read 'em. Personally I believe that this man Weaver, whose book I am forced to advertise, is an abominable poet. I told him so only last week at a literary gathering at the Brevoort at which we were both present. My sole interest in taking this job is to gather material at first hand for my work on 'Humanity in the Raw, with Special Reference to Sociological Phenomena and Philological Tendencies,' which will be published in the fall. I find that in this way I run into any number of people who will be useful for my purpose. Later I may turn my material into the form of a novel, and the dramatic and cinema rights are also available."

The third, travelling signboard was approached with the inward conviction that this one must surely be Joseph Hergeshelmer in disguise, or at least the captain of the Columbia football team. He was discovered at the counter of an orange drink stall, making a simple noonday repast. The reporter joined him in a convivial cruller.

"Do you sandwich men have a union?" he asked.

"Sure," said the sandwich. "I'm a walking delegate."

"What," asked the reporter, "is your opinion of 'The Brimming Cup'?"

"He was rewarded with a suspicious look."

"If you mean beer," said the sandwich. "It hasn't got the old kick. But you can't prove nothing by me."